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Abstract 
In this study the researchers investigate the Bank firm relationship and firm performance under a state-owned 
bank system of Pakistan for the period of six years (2006 to 2011). The nature of the data is secondary and 
selected nineteen firm forms the two different sectors which are listed Karachi stock exchange. Bank firm 
relationship and firm performance are measured by the depended variables TOBINQ, DTTA and INV as proxy. 
TOBINQ is positive relation with the natural logarithm and the other three variables is negative relation with 
TOBINQ. DTTA is negative relation with the natural logarithm, SG and TOBINQ. The DTTA is positive 
relation with INV. INV is negative relation with the natural logarithm. The INV is positive relation with DTTA 
and SG.  The relation of TOBINQ with INV is positive insignificant and the coefficient are also positive. The 
relation of DTTA with INV is positive significant and the coefficient are also positive. The relation of INV with 
SG is positively high significant and the coefficient are also positive. 
 
Introduction 
As we know that money is the life blood of every business, now-a-days, banking sector acts as the backbone of 
modern business in general and specially in whole economy. Development of any country mainly depends on the 
banking system and listed firms. The name bank is either derived from Italian word banc or from a French word 
banquet both mean a Bench or money exchange table. In this paper we investigate a bank-firm relationship 
between Pakistani banks and Pakistani public listed firms and how this relationship affects listed firms’ market 
performance. The question of whether a close bank-firm relationship improves firm performance has been 
studied in other economies. 
It is generally believed that establishing bank firm relationship may help to reduce the conflicts 
between shareholders and creditors. Aoki, Patrick and Sheared (1994) point out that Japanese bank equity 
ownership provides a series of financial and non-financial services to their client firms at substantially lower 
costs compared with their American counterparts over the past decades. There are a dozen of well documented 
literature to attribute the economic success of Germany to the close bank ties. Some researchers argue that such 
close bank relationship can effectively firms’ management and their behavior on the behalf of other financial 
institution or firms (Diamond, 1984; Fama, 1985; Horiuchi, Packer & Fukuda, 1988). 
In addition, such a relationship can decrease the costs of financial instability and control the 
information asymmetry. As a consequence, a firm with such a relationship can get debt easily and they should be 
associated with sound financial performance while the advantages of the close bank relationship are presented in 
the literature, a sizable number of empirical studies have shown the disadvantages in reality. 
Yao and Ouyang (2007) evaluate that there is a ‘dark side ‘of the bank-firm relationship. Actually, 
such relationship damages the firms’ performance because banks always act in the best interests of their own not 
the firms’ interest even though sometimes they have equity holdings within those firms, since usually, the value 
of the debt banks lend to firms is greater than the equity holdings banks have on the firm. 
The aim of this study is to provide some empirical evidence on the impact of the strong bank-firm 
relationship on Pakistani listed firms, since Pakistan provides a unique opportunity to investigate this topic. First, 
the existing literature on this topic in Pakistan is very limited. Second, the major source of borrowing for 
Pakistani industrial companies is banks. Third, Pakistan has its own characteristics of strong bank-firm 
relationship which are different from those in Japan or Germany. 
Some scholars argue that the poor lending practice and poor corporate governance in Pakistan lead to 
non-performance loans and poor financial performance of banks. In this paper, we focus on the impact of this 
bank-firm relationship of listed firms rather than bank performance. In this paper the relationship among firm 
performance (measured by Tobin’s Q), bank loan and investments, we find the relationship between the close 
bank-firm relationship and the listed firms’ performance. 
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
The banking sector and public listed firms play important role in economic development under a state but most 
of the study is available on the other sectors of this economy that’s way we have selected this area for study. 
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1.2 Objectives 
Objectives of the study design are:  
1. To examine the bank firm relationship and firm performance under a state-owned bank system of 
Pakistan for the period of (2006-2011) by using financial ratios. 
2. To investigates a bank-firm relationship between Pakistani banks and Pakistani public listed firms and 
how this relationship affects listed firms market performance.  
 
Literature Review 
Campbell, (1979) in this study Campbell points out that the small unknown companies with creative and 
promising ideas are viewed as major participators. They do not have a lot of external opportunities or internal 
funds raising money. More importantly, they do not need to disclose the proprietary technological information 
related to their ‘leap-frog’ product innovation to their competitors direct or indirect ways. So there is no free 
lunch in the world and great amount of literature also demonstrates significant costs of this close bank 
relationship in the economy. 
Best and Zhang (1993) the researcher evaluate that there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between the bank loan announcements in the stock market and the firm value. The powerful bank-
firm relationships maintain a significant role in the modern financial markets, especially during the financial 
distress. So many researchers agree that debt burdens make companies more unstable in economic turmoil. 
Michael & Gibson (1996) in this study the researcher evaluate stock-market-listed Japanese firms in 
1994-95, the financial health of the firm's main bank they did not significantly affect its investment behavior, 
after controlling for stock market valuation and cash flow. The subset bank-dependent firms, investment was 
lower by over 50 percent at firms that have one of the lowest-rated banks as their main bank. Because low-rate of 
banks are deal with fewer firms, and because bank-dependent firms themselves tend to be smaller than non-bank 
dependent firms, the overall effect on business investment in 1994-95. Gibson result in (1995), a similar study 
which, using data for 1991-92, and find small effect of  poor bank health on investment for all stock-market-
listed Japanese firms and no difference between bank dependent and non-bank-dependent firms. 
Patrick, Takeo & Kim (1997) In this paper the researcher have some aims the first one is to compare 
financial controls through the main bank system to those of capital markets, the second is to analyze the 
relationship between financial controls through the main bank system and the traditional Japanese accounting 
practices, and third one is to analyze appropriate changes for financial controls and related accounting practices. 
The researcher defines a main bank as an investor, which controls all the company management and possessing. 
The researcher shows that a main bank attaches the most importance to refundable earnings, as a creditor, and 
firm value, as a stockholder. 
Gibson in (1995). In this paper the financial control system in present day Japan where financial 
controls through the main bank system no longer functions effectively. For this purpose, the researcher desired 
reform in the accounting system is the disclosure of future cash flows and the attribution of accurate stockholder 
equity amounts and also desired that Japanese management show an accurate and fair reflection of performance 
and financial position to stockholders in the market. They says that change may lead to increased efficiency of 
management, and at the same time, restore the good name of Japanese enterprises that fell in international 
public’s estimation because of corruption and window-dressing. 
Dahiya, Pori & Saunders (2000) the researcher analyzed that the duration of bank relationships using a 
unique panel data set of listed firms and their banks from the bank-dominated Norwegian market. They find that 
firms are more likely to leave a bank as the relationship matures. Small, profitable, and highly-leveraged firms 
maintain short term bank relationships, as do firms with multiple bank relationships. The study findings that 
specifications for the distribution of relationship are duration, and other control variables which is relevant to the 
Norwegian market. Overall, results of cast doubt on theories suggesting that firms become locked into bank 
relationships. 
Thadden (2001) In this study the researcher point out the error in a widely cited paper by Sharpe (1990) 
on long-term bank-firm relationships and to provide a correct analysis of this problem. They show that repeated 
lending under asymmetric information which leads to winner’s-curse type distortions of competition. Contrary to 
the claims in Sharpe (1990), this game only has an equilibrium in mixed strategies, which features a partial 
informational lock-in by firms and random termination of lending relationships. 
Limpaphayom & Polwitoon (2004) in this study the researcher support this argument by presenting 
similar Thai evidence and the researcher also test the relationship between firm performance and bank-firm 
relationship. Tobin’s Q is used as a proxy of firm performance, and lending activities and bank ownership are 
used. The lending variable is a negative relationship with firm performance due to liquidity risk and information 
monopoly in Thailand. A negative function of bank ownership is found with firm performance. A close bank 
relationship may be beneficial for firms in inception, but this effect decline after a certain point. This study also 
illustrates that a close bank firm relationship does improves capital investment. 
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Lu, Thangavelu & Hu (2005) in this study document of the bank loans are allocated to high risky state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) than non-SOEs in China. Their empirical results are based on dataset from Genius 
Database, in years of 1994 to 1999. The researcher fined that lending bias exists in China. However, they have 
not documented anything about the firm performance and bank-firm relationship. Although in China the bank-
firm relationship is very different from those in Japan or Germany, they treat SOEs as firms with strong bank 
relationship because the government owns both SOEs and major banks in China and the government has lending 
policy to support SOEs. 
Castelli, Dwyer. & Hasan (2006) in this study the researchers evaluate the relationship between banks 
and firms’ performance, with possible differences effects related to firms’ size.in this study sample of firms from 
Italy includes many small firms, 99 percent of which are not listed and for which bank debt is a major source of 
financing. The researchers say that, 44 percent of the firms have a single bank relationship, and 66 percent of 
them have five or fewer relationships. They find that return on equity and return on assets decrease as the 
number of bank relationships increases, with a powerful relationship for small firms than for large firms. The 
researchers also find that interest expense over assets increases as the number of relationships increases. 
Particularly for small firms, the results are consistent with analyses indicating that fewer bank relationships 
reduce information asymmetries and agency problems, which have the negative effect. 
Firth & Lin (2008) in this study the researcher evaluate the relations between leverage and investment 
in China’s listed firms, where corporate debt they are provided by state-owned banks. In this paper three major 
findings are. The first one is a negative relation between leverage and investment.  The second one is the 
negative relation between leverage and investment is weaker in firms with low growth opportunities and poor 
operating performance than in firms with high growth opportunities and good operating performance. And the 
third one is the negative relation between leverage and investment is weaker in firms with a higher level of state 
shareholding than in firms with a lower level of state shareholding. The overall results are consistent of the 
hypothesis that the state-owned banks in China impose fewer restrictions on the capital expenditures of low 
growth and poorly performing firms and also firms with greater state ownership.  
Cao, Chen & Chi (2010) In this study these researchers investigated that how close bank-firm 
relationship affects Chinese listed firms ‘and market performance in the yearsof 1999to 2004. The researchers 
find that firms with powerful bank-firm relationship exhibit lower market value and there is a systematic lending 
bias towards firms with dominant state ownership. In the other, firms with worse market performance borrow 
more and firms within strategic industries borrow less because all the financial support from the government. 
The researchers indicate that the government being the ultimate owner of banks and listed companies, the value 
of the firm are low, poor lending practice and poor corporate governance are common in China. 
Nguyen, Skully & Perera (2012)This paper the researcher examines the association between 
government ownership and bank stability in the years of 1997 to 2010 across a sample of 103 countries. The 
researcher use variable to proxy for government ownership continuously, the system GMM estimates and 
researcher indicate that the association between government ownership and bank stability depends on a country’s 
economic development and regulatory quality. In developed, high income countries and government ownership 
is positively associated with bank distance to default. They finding that developing, middle and low-income 
countries. The country used, bank liquidity and interest margin are negatively associated with bank stability. In 
contrast, bank distance to default is positively associated with efficiency and bank capitalization. 
AYA & Mouldl (2012) in this paper the researcher investigated that the impact of bank relationships 
on firm credit and performance for selected Tunisian companies. They used an econometric model and also used 
panel data to analyze 394 Tunisian firms from the different sectors and with different characteristics for the 
period of 2001-2008.the company performance is measured by return on equity and return on assets which are 
considered the best variable of firm’s profit. Our empirical results show that the Tunisian companies having 
several banking relations have more funds but they are less strong than those with exclusive relations. 
Moussu &Troege (2013) in this study the researcher evaluate that reputation of fundamental sustain 
and beneficial financing relationships between banks and companies. In companies value banks with a reputation 
of providing support in case of financial distress. This study demonstrates with a model that in order to maintain 
its reputation a bank may need to adopt restrictive lending policies. Some banks with existing clients will destroy 
its reputation because potential borrowers will not to provide an appropriate level of support. Therefore bank 
might need to reduce the failure rate of its credit portfolio by refusing loans to profitable but some companies are 
restrictive credit policies towards a small fraction of risky borrowers and considered as a side effect of 
maintaining mutually valuable relationships with the majority of less risky ones these risky borrowers will be 
excluded from capital markets, they can still receive loans from specialized arm’s length lenders 
Malekian & Tavakolnia (2014) in this study, the researcher evaluate the economic role of the audit 
report by investigating how to qualified audit opinion affects the financial constraints and debt maturity. The 
sample of this study, there are 146 companies includes  in the Tehran Stock Exchange for the period of four 
years 2009 to 2013 and also processing and testing hypotheses, Estimated Generalized Least Squares (EGLS) 
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method is used. Consistent with the monitoring role of audit opinions on accounting quality and information 
asymmetry view, they find that a qualified audit is increase the financial constraints and decrease the debt 
maturity.  
Alimehmeti, & Paletta, in this paper the researcher investigates the ownership concentration as a 
governance mechanism, and its implications over firm value. They analyzed empirically the overall Italian listed 
firm for the of period four years (2006-2009).The results show in this paper positive relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm value except in 2008, when the results show a non-linear relationship, 
suggesting that the financial crisis has enhanced the expropriation effects. 
 
Research Methodology 
Every research work has its own methodology; therefore we explained the methodology of our research work in 
this section of research. Population of this study is the commercial banks of Pakistan and public listed firms of 
Pakistan data collected from the financial statement analysis. We used nonprobability sampling in the 
nonprobability sampling we selected purposive sampling. The sample for this study was select public listed firms 
and top seven commercial banks in all branches of Pakistan. The banking sector is one of the major service 
sectors in Pakistan there are different categories of banks and firms in Pakistan but we have selected commercial 
banks and public listed firms for this research. In this research we use different financial variables such like 
Return on equity (ROE): this ratio show the financial position of firm and bank also called profitability ratio the 
formula is net income divide by shareholder equity. Log assets (log ta) Natural logarithm of total assets and also 
used for the controlling of firm and bank size. Investment ratio (INV) are defined as the gross investment in 
capital assets (measured by fixed assets in current year minus fixed assets in previous year) then divided by total 
assets. Debt to assets ratio A ratio which shows the relative extent by which firm is using borrowed finance the 
formula  for debts to assets ratio the ratio of total debts divided by total assets. Tobin Q: Tobin’s Q is a market 
value ratios which measure the firm  and bank assets and relation to their market value of a firm, the formula 
Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity plus liabilities then divided by the book value of the assets. Sales growth 
ratio (Sales G): this ratio measure the sale rate time to time or year to year for the evaluating the firm condition 
and are also evaluate the local and national economy the formula is sales in the current or New Year minus sales 
in the previous or old year and then divided by sales in the previous year. 
 
3.1 Source of Data 
Secondary data was collected from the annual reports of banks and public listed firms by using the consolidated 
balance sheet and profit and loss accounts of the banks for the period six years 2006 to 2011.Some other data 
were collected from the journal, library and different papers, articles and relevant past studies through references. 
 
3.2 Variables used in this research. 
Return on equity (ROE): the ratio of net income is divided by the shareholders equity.net income divide by 
shareholder equity. Return on equity is a profitability ratio which shows the financial performance of banks and 
firms.  Log assets (log ta) Natural logarithm of total assets and also used for the controlling of firm and bank size. 
Investment ratio (INV) are defined as the gross investment in capital assets (measured by fixed assets in current 
year minus fixed assets in previous year) then divided by total assets. Debt to assets ratio A ratio which shows 
the relative extent by which firm is using borrowed finance the formula  for debts to assets ratio the ratio of total 
debts divided by total assets. Tobin Q: Tobin’s Q is a market value ratios which measure the market value of 
equity plus liabilities then divided by the book value of the assets. Sales growth ratio (SG); this ratio measure the 
sale rate time to time or year to year for the evaluating the firm condition and are also evaluate the local and 
national economy the formula is sales in the current or New Year minus sales in the previous or old year and 
then divided by sales in the previous year. 
 
3.3 Regression Model 
Statistical Measures That Determine The Relationship Among The Variable Dependent Variable And 
Independent Variable It Present Many Techniques For Modelling And Investigating The Several Variables. The 
Regression Models Show The Relationship Between The Variable Forms One Or More Other Independent 
Variable Regression Models Are Provide The Scientist With A Powerful Tool.   
The Regression Model Will Be of The Form Tobin’s Q = A +β1Natural Log TA it +Β2 Debt to Assets it +Β3 
ROE it+Β4 INV it + Ɛit. Where Tobin’s Q Is Dependent Variable, Α Is Constant, Independent Variables (Β1to 
Β4) Are Independent Variables. 
Debt to Assets = A+Β1 Natural Log_TA it +Β2 Tobin’s Q it +Β3 INV it+ β4 Sales Growth it+ Ɛ it. In This 
Model Debt to Assets Is Dependent Variable, Α Is Constant, Independent Variables (Β1to Β4) Are Independent 
Variables  
INV it = A+β1 Debt to Assets it + Β2 Sales Growth it+ Β3 Log TA it + Ɛit. In This Model INV it Is Dependent 
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Variable, Α Is Constant; The Independent Variables (Β1 to Β4) Are Independent Variables. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
In this research we investigate the bank firm relationship and firm performance by using the regression analysis 
and sample 19 of firms used from two different sectors (listed at Karachi stock exchange Pakistan) along with 
dependent and independent variables. TOBINQ, DTTA, INV is dependent variable and the other variables are as 
independent. 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistic 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
TOBINQ .00 1.99 1.5090 .49504 
ROE -6.27 26.88 .4611 3.64947 
DTTA .00 13.35 1.1474 1.75432 
LNTA .00 20.87 16.0995 3.96515 
INV -2.58 3.14 .0590 .48483 
SG -.65 2.66 .1861 .40778 
In the above table 4.1 the Descriptive model shows the level of variables which consist of minimum, maximum, 
mean, and standard deviation. The average percentage of TOBINQ, ROE, DTTA, LNTA, INV, and SG ratios 
equal to 1.5090, .4611, 1.1474, 16.0995, .0590, and .1861 is respectively. The table provides some information 
about the variables first TOBINQ which ranges from .00 to 1.99 and the standard deviation is .49504.  ROE 
which ranges from -6.27 to 26.88 and standard deviation is 3.64947. Now DTTA standard deviation is 1.75432 
and ranges from .00 to 13.35. LNTA minimum value is .00, maximum value is 20.87 and the standard deviation 
is 3.96515. INV ranges from -2.58 to 3.14 and standard deviation is .48483. SG is last variable which a range is -
.65 to 2.66 and the standard deviation is .40778. 
Table 4.2: Correlations 
  TOBINQ LNTA DTTA ROE INV 
 Pearson Correlation TOBINQ 1.000     
 LNTA .159 1.000    
 DTTA -.199 -.143 1.000   
 ROE -.153 -.113 .236 1.000  
 INV -.075 -.090 .193 .382 1.000 
 
In the above table 4.2 the equation show that the relationship between the variables. TOBINQ is positive relation 
with the natural logarithm and the other three variables is negative relation with TOBINQ. Natural logarithm is 
positive relation with TOBINQ and the other are negative relation with natural logarithm. DTTA is positive 
relation with ROE and INV. 
Table 4.3:  Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .258
a
 .067 .032 .48697 
         a. Predictors: (Constant), INV, LNTA, DTTA, ROE  
In the above table 4.3 the model summary R-Square is 6.7%.Its means that TOBINQ explained by independent 
variable. 
 
Table 4.4: ANOVA 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
 Regression 1.843 4 .461 1.943 .108
a
 
 Residual 25.849 109 .237   
 Total 27.692 113    
                                  a. Predictors: (Constant), INV, LNTA, DTTA, ROE 
                                  b. Dependent Variable: TOBINQ 
 
In the above table 4.4 the f-value of this model is low and the p-value is.108. It means that Tobin’ Q is 
insignificant. 
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Table 4.5: Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) 1.315 .201  6.556 .000 
 LNTA .016 .012 .125 1.332 .186 
 DTTA -.044 .027 -.157 -1.632 .106 
 ROE -.014 .014 -.104 -1.020 .310 
 INV .006 .103 .006 .062 .951 
       a. Dependent Variable: TOBINQ 
 
According to the above table 4.5 the equation show that the relationship between the dependent variable 
TOBINQ and the independent variables. The t-value of investment is .062 and the p-value is .951. The 
coefficient of investment .008 it means that the relation of TOBINQ with INV is positive insignificant and the 
coefficient are also positive. The return on equity and debt to assets are negatively insignificant and the natural 
logarithm is positive insignificant. The coefficient are also negative of the return on equity and debt to assets so 
the negative sign of coefficient means that  decrease in these variables after changes made in DTTA. The 
positive sign of coefficient indicate that increase these variables after making changes in DTTA. 
 
Table 4.6: Correlations 
  DTTA LN_TA TOBINQ INV SG 
 Pearson Correlation DTTA 1.000     
 LN_TA -.143 1.000    
 TOBINQ -.199 .159 1.000   
 INV .193 -.090 -.075 1.000  
 SG -.080 .062 .127 .285 1.000 
 
In the above table 4.6 the equation show that the relationship between the variables. DTTA is negative relation 
with the natural logarithm. SG and TOBINQ. The INV is positive relation with DTTA. Natural logarithm is 
negative relation with INV, and positive relation with TOBINQ and SG. TOBINQ is negative relation with INV 
and positive relation with SG. The relation of INV is positive relation with SG. 
 
Table 4.7: Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .304
a
 .093 .059 1.70152 
                               a. Predictors: (Constant), SG, LNTA, TOBINQ, INV 
In the above table 4.7 the model summary shows that R-Square is 9.3%. Its mean that DTTA is explained by 
independent variable. 
Table 4.8: ANOVA 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
 Regression 32.202 4 8.051 2.781 .030
a
 
 Residual 315.572 109 2.895   
 Total 347.775 113    
        a. Predictors: (Constant), SG, LNTA, TOBINQ, INV 
        b. Dependent Variable: DTTA 
 
In the above table 4.8 the f-value of this model is 2.781 and the p-value is.030. it means that DTTA is significant.  
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Table 4.9: Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) 2.680 .783  3.424 .001 
 LNTA -.041 .041 -.093 -1.000 .320 
 TOBINQ -.546 .332 -.154 -1.646 .103 
 INV .743 .348 .205 2.133 .035 
 SG -.488 .416 -.113 -1.175 .243 
                      a. Dependent Variable: DTTA 
 
In the above table4.9 equation show that the relationship between the dependent variable DTTA and the 
independent variables. The t-value of investment is 2.133 and the p-value is .035. The coefficient of 
investment .743 it means that the relation of DTTA with INV is positive significant and the coefficient are also 
positive. The sales growth, Tobin, and natural logarithm are negatively insignificant and the coefficient are also 
negative so the negative sign of coefficient means that  decrease in these variables after changes made in DTTA. 
The positive sign of coefficient indicate that increase these variables after making changes in DTTA 
 
Table 4.10: Correlations 
  INV DTTA SG LNTA 
 Pearson Correlation INV 1.000    
 DTTA .193 1.000   
 SG .285 -.080 1.000  
 LNTA -.090 -.143 .062 1.000 
 
In the above table 4.10 the equation show that the relationship between the variables. INV is negative relation 
with the natural logarithm. The INV is positive relation with DTTA and SG.  The DTTA is negative relation 
with SG and Natural logarithm. The relation of SG is positive relation with Natural logarithm  
Table 4.11: Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .367
a
 .135 .111 .45714 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LNTA, SG, DTTA 
 
In the above table 4.11 the model summary result show that the R-Square 13.5%. Its means that INV explained 
by the independent variables. 
Table 4.12: ANOVA 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
 Regression 3.574 3 1.191 5.700 .001
a
 
 Residual 22.988 110 .209   
 Total 26.562 113    
               a. Predictors: (Constant), LNTA, SG, DTTA 
                b. Dependent Variable: INV 
 
In the above table 4.12 the f-value is 5.700 and the p-value is .001. It means that INV is significant. 
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Table 4.13: Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) .082 .188  .436 .664 
 DTTA .057 .025 .206 2.295 .024 
 SG .365 .106 .307 3.444 .001 
 LNTA -.010 .011 -.079 -.885 .378 
                        a. Dependent Variable: INV 
 
In the 4.13 table the equation show the relationship between the dependent variable INV and the independent 
variables. The t-value of Sales growth is 3.444 and the p-value is .001. The coefficient of investment 0.365 it 
means that the relation of INV with SG is positively high significant and the coefficient are also positive. The 
debt to assets is positively significant , and natural logarithm are negatively insignificant and the coefficient are 
also negative of the natural logarithm so the negative sign of coefficient means that  decrease in these variables 
after changes made in  INV. The positive sign of coefficient indicate that increase these variables after making 
changes in INV. 
 
Conclusion  
In this research we examined bank firm relationship and firm performance under a state-owned Bank system of 
Pakistan. We used secondary data for the period of six years from 2006 to 2011 and listed 19 firm of Karachi 
stock exchange. Bank firm relationship and firm performance is measured by the TOBINQ, DTTA and INV 
used is a proxies. We analyzed the results and conclude that TOBINQ is positive relation with the natural 
logarithm and the other three variables is negative relation with TOBINQ. DTTA is negative relation with the 
natural logarithm, SG and TOBINQ. The DTTA is positive relation with INV. INV is negative relation with the 
natural logarithm. The INV is positive relation with DTTA and SG.  The relation of TOBINQ with INV is 
positive insignificant and the coefficient are also positive. The relation of DTTA with INV is positive significant 
and the coefficient are also positive. The relation of INV with SG is positively high significant and the 
coefficient are also positive. 
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